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Recent Cases
CONTRACTs-STATTE OF FnAuDs--iGHT OF REALTY BROKER TO CoLLEcr
COMIMSSION ON QuANTum MERurr-The defendants orally listed with
a realty broker certain real property for sale. The broker produced a
purchaser who submitted a written offer to buy defendants' property
and defendants accepted the offer in writing. On the day set for clos-
ing the transaction the defendants refused to convey the property to
the purchaser and subsequently refused to pay the broker a commis-
sion. The only written evidence of the contract for a commission was
the name of the broker written at the top of the offer and acceptance
form. The broker sought to recover on the contract and in the alterna-
tive on quantum meruit. The Circuit Court of Fayette County
sustained the defendants' general demurrer to the broker's amended
petition and dismissed the petition when the broker declined to plead
further. The broker appealed. Held: reversed. The contract for the
commission of a realty broker is specifically within the statute of
frauds (KRS 371.010(8) ) and thereby required to be in writing. The
writing of the broker's name at the top of the offer and acceptance
form was only evidence of a prior parol agreement and not sufficient
to satisfy the statute of frauds. Nevertheless the broker may recover
his commission on quantum meruit for services rendered. Clinkenbeard
v. Poole, 266 S.W. 2d 796 (Ky. 1954).
The Court reasoned in this case that, although an action on an oral
contract within the statute of frauds may not be maintained, the law
will not ordinarily permit a party to keep the benefit which has been
conferred upon him by another party under an unenforceable contract.
The statute of frauds was not intended to be used in such a manner
as to allow one party to enrich himself at the expense of another. In
many previous cases in Kentucky this rule has been applied in allowing
a party to recover the value of his services when a contract under
which these services were rendered was held unenforceable under the
statute of frauds.'
Prior to 1950 the case law in Kentucky was clear in holding that
brokerage agreements, which defined the rights of owner and broker
as between themselves, were not within the statute of frauds where no
'Head v. Schwartz' Ex'r, 304 Ky. 798, 202 S.W. 2d 623 (1947); Carpenter
v. Carpenter, 299 Ky. 738, 187 S.W. 2d 282 (1945); Hinton v. Hinton's Ex'r, 239
Ky. 664, 40 S.W. 2d 296 (1931); Randolph v. Castle, 190 Ky. 776, 228 S.W. 418
(1921); Duke's Admr v. Crump, 185 Ky. 323, 215 S.W. 41 (1919); Boone v. Coe,
153 Ky. 233, 154 S.W. 900, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 907 (1913).
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interest in land passed between the parties. Such brokerage agree-
ments were considered as being in the nature of employment contracts
and enforceable though oral.
2
In 1950 the Kentucky legislature enacted an amendment to the
statute of frauds which specifically placed such brokerage agreements
within the statute.3 The principal case is the only case to date in-
terpreting the new amendment.4 Although the Court recognized the
amendment as applicable to the contract in question, it may be argued
that the Court has nullified the effect of the amendment by allowing
recovery on quantum meruit.
Looking at the problem in other jurisdictions, it may be said that
there is some general support for allowing one to collect the value of
the benefit he has conferred on another, through a theory of quantum
meruit, when the contract under which he has performed is made
unenforceable under the statute of frauds. It has been stated that,
One who has performed labor and services under a con-
tract which cannot be enforced because within the statute of frauds,
and which has been repudiated by the other party thereto, may re-
cover for such services on a quantum meruit.5
Further, there is some indication that where the statute of frauds
of a particular state does not specifically include agreements to com-
pensate a realty broker, but such a contract is otherwise found to be
within the statute, some form of implied contract or quantum meruit
2 Henson v. Arnold, 310 Ky. 742, 221 S.W. 2d 662 (1949); Stuart-McKnight
& Co. v. Monroe, 222 Ky. 602, 1 S.W. 2d 1054 (1928); Nisbet v. Dozier, 204 Ky.
204, 263 S.W. 736 (1924); Oliver v. Morgan, 198 Ky. 442, 248 S.W. 1020 (1923),
Carter v. Hall, 191 Ky. 75, 229 S.W. 132 (1921); Womack v. Douglas, 157 Ky.
716, 163 S.W. 1130 (1914); Shadwick v. Smith, 147 Ky. 159, 143 S.W. 1027
(1912); Whitworth v. Pool, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1104, 96 S.W. 880 (1906); Annot.,
151 A.L.R. 641, 651 (1944).
s Ky. Rev. Stat. see. 371.010 states:
"Statute of frauds: contracts to be written. No action
shall be brought to charge any person:
(8) Upon any promise, agreement, or contract for any commis-
sion or compensation for the sale or lease of any real estate or for
assisting another in the sale or lease of any real estate: unless the
promise, contract, agreement, representation, assurance or ratification,
some memorandum or note thereof, be in writing and signed by the
party to be charged therewith, or by his authorized agent. The con-
sideration need not be expressed in the writing, but it may be proved
when necessary or disapproved by parol or other evidence." (1950,
c. 174; effective June 15, 1950).
4 But see Treacy v. James, 274 S.W. 2d 46 (Ky. 1954). This case involved
essentially the same facts as those in the Clinkenbeard case, and the Court of Ap-
peals refused to consider the theory of quantum meruit as a basis for recovery
since such relief was not prayed for in the court below.
5 37 C.J.S. Statute of Frauds, see 259 (1943); see cases from twenty jurisdic-
tions, Id. at 780, n. 87.
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will be allowed to give the broker recovery. But there are actually too
few cases on the subject to reflect a definite rule."
However, in states in which the statute of frauds specifically in-
cludes such agreements, there has been overwhelming uniformity in
holding that agreements to compensate a broker must be in writing
to be enforceable and that in event the statute is not satisfied there
can be no recovery in quantum meruit, implied contract, or the like,
for the broker's services.7 The theory advanced in favor of such a view
is that to hold otherwise would be to nullify the effect of the statute
completely.8
Kentucky, by virtue of the principal case, represents the only
jurisdiction with a clear-cut minority decision.9 In this view Kentucky
has some support from two other jurisdictions, although the support
is indirect in one instance and dictum in another.10
In order to properly evaluate this Kentucky decision, it appears
advisable to consider briefly the merits of placing contracts for the
broker's commission between a broker and a vendor within the statute
of frauds.
The object of requiring such an agreement to be in writing is ap-
parently to protect unsuspecting landowners from scheming realty
brokers. But why 'assume that realty brokers, as a group, are more
scheming and dishonest than any other business group? A retailer
seels his goods and then submits his bill, a doctor or a lawyer performs
professional services and then presents his bill, and these contracts,
though oral, are given legal significance. In such cases the ordinary
burden of proof on the plaintiff and the other processes of justice are
deemed adequate to protect a defendant from spurious claims. Why
should landowners be singled out for a more special protection?"
Another practical consideration in regard to requiring contracts
6 Annot., 41 A.L.R. 20, 901, 919 (1954).
7 Id. at 908.
8 Id. at 910.
9 Ibid.
10 An Oregon case apparently assumed that recovery might be had in quantum
meruit, although the contract did not satisfy a statute providing that agreements
for a broker's commission must be in writing, since the claim for quantum meruit
was considered on the merits, although the claim was found to be unjustified.
Taylor v. Peterson, 76 Ore. 77, 147 Pac. 520 (1915).
As dictum, a New Jersey court stated that it did not follow
"that an admittedly retained real estate agent is not entitled to com-
pensation for negotiating a sale of real estate for a receiver if his
authority is not in writing or he has failed to comply in other respects
with the provisions of the statute. If his services are necessary or
beneficial to the estate, reasonable allowance will be made."
Merchants & Mfrs. Nat. Bank v. Newark Rubber Co., 131 AUt. 889, 390 (1925).
11 See Lasser, "Real Estate Broker's Commission-Oral Agreements and Statute
of Frauds", 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 410, 411-12 (1955).
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for realty brokers' commissions to be written is the hardship visited
on a broker in obtaining such agreements from a vendor. A landowner
may well feel that it is a slur on his integrity for a broker to insist on a
written agreement and therefore he may take his business to another
broker who is willing to chance the honesty of the landowner in order
to obtain business. The vendor then has the protection of the statute
of frauds if he chooses not to pay the broker his commission.12
The Court of Appeals in the principal case has recognized section 8
of the Kentucky statute of frauds as applicable to the contract in ques-
tion but nevertheless allowed recovery on quantum meruit. While the
decision of the Court may have circumvented the statute of frauds, it
is difficult to find this result alarming. Not only does quantum meruit
have support as a basis for recovery where a contract, either for
broker's commission or for labor and services, has been held unenforce-
able because within the statute of frauds, but there also seems to be
no valid policy reasons in favor of denying recovery.
Arthur L. Brooks, Jr.
EvIDENcE-DoEs THE PRIVmEGE AGASINT SELF-INCRIMI,1NATION ExTEND
TO INCRIINATION UNDER THE LAws OF ANOTHER JURISDICION?-The
witness, Rhine, was summoned before the Jefferson County, Kentucky,
grand jury and questioned concerning his relations with the Com-
munist Party and Carl Braden. Braden had been convicted for violat-
ing the Kentucky sedition laws, but that conviction had been reversed
earlier by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky on the ground that Con-
gress had pre-empted the field of sedition.' Rhine refused to answer
certain questions2 propounded by the Commonwealth's Attorney on
the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate him. The trial
court ruled that Rhine was privileged to refuse to answer the questions,
and the Commonwealth appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
purpose of a certification of law under Section 337 of the Kentucky
12 Id. at 412.
1 Braden v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W. 2d 843 (Ky. 1956).
2 The following questions were asked Rhine:
"56 Q. Mr. Rhine, regardless of whether or not you are a Communist
-I am not interested in that-but do you know whether or not Carl
Braden is a Communist?
"57 Q. Did you ever attend a Communist Party meeting in Carl
Braden's house-without asking or wanting to know what effect such
attendance might have had on you, if any effect, but in view of that,
did you ever attend any meeting in Carl Braden's house relative to
Communism or where a cell meeting was being held?"
Commonwealth v. Rhine, 303 S.W. 2d 301, 302 (Ky. 1957).
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